RUSSIA’S STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE
Kateryna Shymkevych
Ph.D. in History, Head of Analytical Center for Balkan Studies
Nataliia Malynovska
Journalist, co-founder of Analytical Center for Balkan Studies
Summary
For Russia, the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe remain strategically important for conducting destabilizing activities against the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and for returning the Russian Federation (RF) to the foreign policy orbit of these states.
Moscow demonstrates flexibility in its approaches and tactics, departing where necessary from traditional methods of promoting ideas of Christian (Orthodox) spiritual affinity and values, as well as deep historical and cultural ties. Depending on the country and its internal and external conditions, specific tools and mechanisms of influence and interference are selected. Serbia, Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)), Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary continue to serve as “Trojan horses”, although Moscow currently faces a degree of uncertainty with regard to Sofia and Budapest.
Situation Assessment
Serbia, Republika Srpska (an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)), Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia remain the traditionally supportive countries of Kremlin foreign policy activities. At the same time, it can be observed that – owing to the rise of pro-Russian forces, domestic economic, political, and social difficulties, and the rehabilitation of Vladimir Putin and Russia as a result of the actions of the United States (US) administration – Russophilia is growing in other countries as well: Slovenia and Croatia (where influence is channelled through Italy, Austria, and Germany), Greece, and the Czech Republic. Compared to previous years, the trend of actively drawing Serbs in partially recognized Kosovo, Montenegro, and Croatia into the Kremlin’s orbit continues. Albania, North Macedonia, Poland, and Romania have also not escaped Russian influence, where hybrid operations function in a targeted manner, exploiting longstanding domestic problems.
Russian Presence in Countries: General Analysis
Albania
Political Landscape. The political situation has recently grown tense between the main parties – the Socialists and the Democrats. Political instability is accompanied by numerous protests by the country’s citizens. The country is a member of NATO and seeks to integrate into the EU. As of 2025, the country is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. There is an outflow of labor to EU countries, which in turn contributes to an inflow of foreign currency remittances from migrant workers. The country’s main economic partner is the EU. Albania’s geographic location makes it a convenient logistics hub, opening good opportunities for Ukrainian business.
Society. A significant portion of the population supports Albania’s accession to the EU. The country’s citizens are predominantly anti-Russian. Strong support for Ukraine is recorded.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. Albania has no Russian state institutions promoting the idea of the “Russian world”. However, a number of civic organizations are active. For example, the Russian-Albanian Friendship Society and a community of Russian compatriots operate in the country.
Bulgaria
Political Landscape. The political situation is unstable and marked by high turbulence – permanent problems forming unstable governments, a fragile parliamentary coalition, and political forces unable to compromise. As a result, no reset of the political system takes place, and “old” faces remain in power. As of 2025, Bulgaria was on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. The country is dependent on Russia for technical support of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, which generates over 40% of its electricity. Lukoil Bulgaria, a subsidiary of the Russian oil and gas giant, is the largest oil refinery in the Balkans, supplying Bulgaria’s domestic market.
Society. Society is sharply polarized regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The absence of a decommunization process leads to nostalgia for the socialist past, which creates fertile ground for direct and hybrid influence from Moscow.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. At Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, the Faculty of Slavic Philology hosts two departments – the Department of Russian Language and the Department of Russian Literature. There is no Russian Center of the Russkiy Mir Foundation. Instead, “Russkiy Mir Cabinets” exist as a targeted program of the foundation. Social media accounts of the “Russian House in Bulgaria” are active.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Political Landscape. Due to its complex state structure, the political situation in the country appears unstable, and state institutions are weak. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) consists of two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The main point of instability is the Republika Srpska entity and its former president, Milorad Dodik. For many years, he has been promoting the idea of separating Republika Srpska from BiH, and holds positions of active Russophilia, Euroscepticism, and expansion of the Serbian world. As of 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. The country has a weakly developed economy and is dependent on foreign investment. There is an Intergovernmental Russian–Bosnian-Herzegovinian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation.
Society. Politicians representing the three main ethnic groups – Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats – hold differing views on the future of the state. In recent years, the narrative about the need to restructure Bosnia and Herzegovina into a state with three entities – Bosniak, Croat, and Serb – has resurfaced. Milorad Dodik actively exploits this, advocating for separation from Bosnia and Herzegovina and unification with Serbia. Bosniaks and Croats support Ukraine and condemn Russian aggression; Serbs, on the contrary, speak out against the imposition of sanctions on the RF.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. The Russian-Serbian Club “Fraternal Ties” is active. In Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska, the Russkiy Mir Foundation is implementing an international cultural project. Republika Srpska serves as one of the centers and bridgeheads of Russian hybrid influence in the Balkans; it develops independent ties with Russia and its regions, universities, and companies.
Greece
Political Landscape. The political situation in Greece is fairly stable. The ruling party, New Democracy, holds pro-European views. As an EU member state, it participates in imposing sanctions on Russia. Since 2015, Greece has served as a gateway for migrants from African and Middle Eastern countries into the EU. Russian propaganda uses this to continually promote anti-European and anti-migration narratives. As of 2025, Greece is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. Greece’s main economic partners are EU countries. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Greece managed to eliminate its dependence on Russian energy resources.
Society. The majority of Greece’s population supports Ukraine, which has had no effect whatsoever on the level of Russophilia in the country. There is a trend toward growing Russian presence in education, culture, church and religious life, and politics. The Kremlin actively uses the Russian diaspora and Russian compatriots to promote propaganda and disinformation.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. Through the network of the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), ideas of shared Orthodox faith and the kinship of peoples are promoted, along with the popularization of the Russian language, literature, and culture, while a distorted view of Russian history and justification of the aggression against Ukraine are imposed.
Kosovo (Partially Recognized State)
Political Landscape. The political situation is tense due to the ongoing conflict with Serbia. Kosovo’s authorities hold a firmly anti-Russian position. In its foreign policy, it is oriented toward the EU and the US. The authorities in Kosovo are highly supportive of Ukraine. Pristina has joined the EU’s sanctions against Russia.
Economic Aspects. Ukraine is actively developing economic cooperation with Kosovo. In February 2025, the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry decided to appoint an official representative in Kosovo, an important step in relations between Kyiv and Pristina.
Society. Society is anti-Russian, as it sees parallels between Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the events of the 1990s. This is one of the reasons why journalists, analysts, and experts in Kosovo actively study Russian hybrid influence within their own information space.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. Moscow does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, which does not prevent Russia from maintaining a separate office in Pristina. It operates as a branch of the Russian embassy in Serbia.
Moldova
Political Landscape. The country is experiencing palpable political turbulence, characterized by fierce rivalry between the ruling pro-European political forces and the pro-Russian opposition. Transnistria, where a Russian military contingent is stationed, is a source of threat to the country’s national security. Moldova is seeking to rid itself of Russian influence on its territory.
Economic Aspects. For a long time, Moldova’s economy was dependent on Russia. Following the EU’s imposition of sanctions on Russia for its act of aggression against Ukraine, Moldova is reorienting itself toward other sources of energy supply.
Society. The reaction to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is mixed. A segment of the country’s citizens who support the state’s intentions toward European integration condemns the war unleashed by Russia. A neutral-skeptical segment of the population believes it is more expedient for the country to remain neutral in this situation. The pro-Russian segment of society supports the RF and consumes Russian propagandistic media.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. A representative office of Rossotrudnichestvo, the “Russian House”, is located in Chișinău. Russian Language Cabinets operate in the territory of the self-proclaimed, unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.
North Macedonia
Political Landscape. One can speak of relative stability, although the current government is focused on its own identity. After Donald Trump assumed the office of US President for a second time, the country’s foreign policy became more US-centric. North Macedonia supports NATO decisions on assistance to Ukraine. The country’s previous government provided military assistance – Soviet-model equipment and ammunition. As of 2025, North Macedonia is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. The main trading partners are EU countries. The economy is generally weak, there is a shortage of skilled workers, and a constant outflow of labor is observed. Russia’s impact on the economy is minimal.
Society. Society does not support Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine. A gradual rise in Russophilia is observed, although a critical attitude toward Russia continues to be present in society.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. A “Russkiy Mir Cabinet” and a Russian Center at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University have been opened in Skopje. The operation of the Rossotrudnichestvo “Russian House” has been suspended since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine. Over the course of 2024–2025, an intensification of business ties and educational, cultural, and scientific contacts between North Macedonia and Russia has been observed.
Poland
Political Landscape. The political situation in Poland is polarized: the president, as a representative of the conservative “Law and Justice” party, is in conflict with the government, which is composed of a pro-European coalition. Poland views Ukraine as its economic competitor, and tension in relations is observed due to differing views on historical events. Despite this, Ukraine and Poland are united on the issue of countering Russian aggression. As of 2025, Poland is included on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. The country’s economy is independent of Russia. This applies both to the export of goods and to energy supply matters.
Society. Poland’s population is polarized regarding the war in Ukraine and regarding the presence in Poland of Ukrainian citizens who have been forced to become refugees.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. There are no Russian cabinets or Russian centers sponsored by the Russkiy Mir Foundation.
Romania
Political Landscape. The political situation is characterized by a pro-European orientation, although in recent years a rise in right-wing populist forces has been recorded. In April 2026, Romania entered a political crisis. Romania continues to support Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression without much public fanfare, taking a pragmatic approach. As of 2025, it is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. Romania has no dependence on Russian energy resources, as it has its own oil and gas production. The same applies to trade – Romania is oriented toward the EU market.
Society. A negative perception of Russia is noted, linked not only to the military events in Ukraine but also to the country’s own negative historical experience of relations dating back to the Russian Empire. Russia is perceived as a state that threatens security in the Black Sea region. It can be argued that anti-Russian sentiment in Romania is among the strongest of any state in the Balkan region.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. There are no Russian centers, but a Section of Russian-Language Literary, Educational, and Methodological Literature operates within the Community of Lipovan Russians in Bucharest. In 2023, Romania closed Rossotrudnichestvo’s representative office, operating as the Russian Center of Science and Culture in Bucharest.
Serbia
Political Landscape. Serbia exhibits a formal democracy. President Aleksandar Vučić and his political force, the Serbian Progressive Party, control the government, part of the parliament, and the media. Opposition political forces are weak and fragmented. Since November 2024, the country has been living in a state of continuous citizen protests against the president’s authoritarian rule. In foreign policy, a multi-vector approach is evident: balancing between the EU and the RF. Regarding the war in Ukraine, Serbia positions itself as a neutral state. As of 2025, it is not on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. Serbia’s economy depends mainly on three players – the EU, China, and Russia. The defense industry is not a defining sector of the economy, though its development and the growth of product exports, including to Ukraine and Israel, have recently been observed.
Society. A significant portion of Serbian society is pro-Russian, viewing Russia as an ally and a “fraternal Orthodox nation”. A minority supports Ukraine and condemns Russia’s aggression against it. A part of society takes a neutral position.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. Of all the countries in the Balkan region, Russia’s presence in the humanitarian sphere is greatest in Serbia. A considerable number of various civic organizations operate here, such as “Russian-Serbian Friendship”. The Rossotrudnichestvo representative office, the “Russian House” in Belgrade, conducts extremely active operations. Close contacts and ties with the Russian scientific, political, educational, and expert community are observed. A number of pro-Russian mass media outlets operate in Serbia, although their activity is presented as purely Serbian. There is an extensive network of Russian and pro-Russian Telegram channels.
Slovakia
Political Landscape. Robert Fico’s government pursues a populist policy domestically, flirts with Russia, yet does not distance itself from the EU. Regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Fico promotes Russian narratives. As of 2025, Slovakia, like other EU member states, is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. The greatest dependency of Slovakia’s economy is the energy sector. Fico’s government continues to advocate for the purchase of energy resources from Russia, deliberately refusing to reduce dependence on Moscow.
Society. Citizens are polarized in their attitudes toward Russia’s war against Ukraine. A significant portion supports Ukraine and condemns Russia for its act of aggression, while another portion of society maintains a position of neutrality. A smaller number of Slovak citizens hold a pro-Russian position.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. There is no Russian center or “Russkiy Mir Cabinets” in Slovakia. The “Russian House” in Bratislava was closed in 2023, but its operations were resumed in the summer of 2025.
Slovenia
Political Landscape. In March 2026, parliamentary elections were held in Slovenia that produced no clear winner. Zoran Stevanović, who holds a pro-Russian position, advocates for the lifting of sanctions against Russia, and campaigns for a referendum on Slovenia’s withdrawal from NATO, became the new speaker of parliament. As of 2025, Slovenia is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. Slovenia’s economy is integrated into the EU economy. Trade has contracted due to the sanctions imposed on Russia. There is no energy dependence on Russia. However, business contacts between Slovenia and Russia are maintained.
Society. Society holds entirely pro-Ukrainian views and supports the provision of humanitarian aid. Slovenian citizens are characterized by Russophilia, which Moscow has managed to “cultivate” by relying on the traditional components of the “Russian world”: historical and cultural ties, and the “greatness” of Russian literature.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. A Russian Center operates on the basis of the non-profit organization “Russian House” in the city of Maribor.
Hungary
Political Landscape. Regarding the position of Hungary’s new prime minister, Péter Magyar, on the issue of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is difficult to make preliminary forecasts, since a neutral stance could develop into support for Ukraine or remain at its starting point. It can be assumed that Hungary’s dialogue with Ukraine will proceed on a pragmatic level. This may be influenced by Hungary’s potential exit from the eurosceptic camp, should Péter Magyar attempt to establish a constructive dialogue with Brussels in order to unblock funding for his country. As of 2025, Hungary is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. Hungary is dependent on Russian energy resources, and Budapest, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, has not attempted to diversify them. Péter Magyar has stated that he will not abandon Russian fossil energy resources all at once.
Society. The majority of the population holds a neutral position regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The main reason is fear of Hungary’s potential entanglement in the war. A smaller portion of Hungarians hold a pro-Ukrainian position.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. A Russian Center operates in Budapest at Eötvös Loránd University, as does a Russian Center of the University of Pécs in the city of Pécs. The “Russian House” in Budapest also continues its active operations in the Hungarian capital.
Croatia
Political Landscape. A stable democracy with a pro-European course is developing in the country. There is internal competition between the prime minister and the president, who holds pro-Russian views. The government, by contrast, demonstrates absolute support for Ukraine. As of 2025, Croatia is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. Croatia’s economy is integrated into the European market and is not dependent on Russia; the country has managed to diversify its energy supply.
Society. Croatian citizens show a high level of support for Ukraine, although a certain portion of citizens criticizes the government’s pro-Ukrainian actions and supports the president’s statements on the need not to interfere in the “conflict in Ukraine”.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. There is no Russian center or “Russkiy Mir Cabinet”. The activity of the “Russian House” in Zagreb has been suspended. A Department of Russian Language and a Department of Russian Literature operate at the University of Zagreb.
Montenegro
Political Landscape. Montenegro went through a period of political turbulence and experienced Russian influence, but is now demonstrating a strong drive to join the EU for security reasons. The government has tightened residency rules for Russians, forcing many to leave the country. In 2025, the Parliament of Montenegro decided to have the country’s Armed Forces join the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine mission. As of 2025, the country is on the RF’s list of “unfriendly foreign states”.
Economic Aspects. The economy is weak, with significant budget revenues coming from the tourism sector. Montenegro is attempting to develop green energy and renewable energy sources. At the same time, the Montenegrin economy is quite sensitive to regional security and depends on foreign investment.
Society. Montenegrins support Ukraine and the government’s actions in granting asylum to Ukrainian refugees and in Montenegro’s participation in European initiatives aimed at supporting Ukraine. At the same time, a segment of society seeking to preserve Serbian identity, as well as a number of politicians, criticize the authorities for “dragging” the country into the war.
RF Presence in the Humanitarian Sphere. There is no Russian center or “Russkiy Mir Cabinet”. The Faculty of Philology at the University of Montenegro in the city of Nikšić has a Department of Russian Language and Literature. In 2024, the “Saint Alexander Nevsky” cultural center began operating in Nikšić to strengthen ties with the “Russian House” in Belgrade and the Russian embassies in Serbia and Montenegro.
Conclusions and Forecasts
Russia has changed its strategy and tactics in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, which is especially evident in the Balkan region. The RF has made its soft power more aggressive and targeted, embedding it within the context of the rapid development and entrenchment of Russophilia. It is on this bridgehead that tactical measures for spreading hybrid influence and building propagandistic networks of mass media, social networks, and institutions have been constructed.
Countries Serving as Pillars of Russia’s Influence
In its activities, Moscow will continue to rely on Republika Srpska (BiH) and its leadership, Serbia, Slovakia, and potentially Hungary and Bulgaria. The latter two countries are currently in a political transition period, but existing trends suggest that Budapest and Sofia will be used by the Kremlin in a targeted manner and across various directions.
These countries offer the Kremlin “hooks” for its activities – in Budapest, these are energy resources and economic-business ties; in Bulgaria, entrenched Russophilia and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. A common factor will remain a high level of Euroscepticism and criticism of NATO.
Key Role of Rossotrudnichestvo
A significant number of various organizations operate in the region, created by Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, and the Kremlin’s special services, which work with Russian compatriots abroad. It can be forecast that, going forward, it will be precisely Russian compatriots who are used as agents of the “Russian world” to entrench anti-Ukrainian narratives in the societies of the region’s countries regarding the war, Ukrainian territories, history, culture, language, the authorities in Ukraine, and so on.
Despite the closure or suspension of activities of “Russian Houses” and “Russian Centers” in a number of states, the Kremlin is not halting its work, seeking new channels for destabilizing each state and the region as a whole. This situation will persist owing to the presence in Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, and Republika Srpska (BiH) of dependence on Russian energy resources, as well as due to the presence of Russian involvement in a number of national economies.
Serbian and Hungarian Worlds
There is continuous support from Moscow for the ideology of the Serbian World, which in recent years has acquired methodological and institutional form. Through this ideology and its components – Serbian-Russian ties, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the need to “protect” Serbian identity and statehood – Moscow will act actively and purposefully in order to keep Serbia, Republika Srpska, Montenegro, and North Macedonia under its control.
It cannot be ruled out that the RF will attempt to use the concept of the Hungarian World to destabilize the situation in Hungary and neighboring countries with a significant Hungarian diaspora. It is likely that Russia will need a certain amount of time to transform its policy toward Hungary and the whole of Central Europe. The point of entry will undoubtedly be energy resources – oil and gas, which will be trigger issues in the new Budapest leadership’s relations with Brussels.
Destabilization
The region will remain a zone of stably unstable Europe, where political, social, and economic crises become the norm. This is especially evident with regard to Bulgaria, Kosovo, BiH, and Serbia. Even relatively stable Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Moldova fall into the zone of instability risk due to the RF’s constant hybrid interference, unresolved domestic problems, and corruption.
Interethnic relations will remain one of the destabilizing factors in Serbia, North Macedonia, BiH, and Montenegro. Serbia will play one of the key roles in this process within the RF’s activities. This is attractive to Moscow, which can stoke the situation with the help of local politicians, businessmen, or activists, or can carry out direct hybrid operations.
US and EU Presence
The Trump administration will maintain a sporadic presence in the region, as Donald Trump and his entourage have business interests in Balkan countries, which will affect Central European countries as well. Possible signs of interest may emerge toward maritime countries that have port infrastructure and can develop it for the supply of energy resources from other states.
It is unlikely that the EU will act aggressively or exert strong pressure on countries where problems with European integration arise or where the domestic situation becomes more complicated. Sanctions and the suspension of financial assistance will remain the main mechanisms.
Implications for Ukraine
The pro-Ukrainian position in most countries of the region will be maintained, since governments will continue to act from positions of pragmatism and the safeguarding of their own interests. Despite this, a decline in the level of support for Ukraine and Ukrainians may be observed due to the growth of Russian propaganda and the expansion of the boundaries of the “Russian world” through representatives of scientific-academic and educational institutions, political elites, and Russian compatriots who advocate for more active contacts with Russia. Accordingly, Ukraine should step up advocacy and promotion abroad, and develop new individual strategies and tactics of work for each country in the region.
Particular attention should be paid to the continuous monitoring of the European integration processes of Montenegro and Albania, which are the foremost candidates for EU accession, as well as of Serbia, since this country is an example of significant concessions on the part of Brussels for the sake of its own economic and political gain, and for preserving the EU’s influence over democratization processes and its presence in the country.
The publication is prepared under the project “Strengthening the Analytical Capabilities of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making with the Civil Society” of the Centre for International Security with the support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ukraine.
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