BELARUS AS MILITARY-STRATEGIC BRIDGEHEAD OF RUSSIA IN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND THREAT TO EUROPE
Valentyn Badrak
Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies
Valeriia Chumak
Expert of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies
Summary
The Republic of Belarus, which provided Russia with the opportunity to launch a military invasion of Ukraine from its territory and has stationed Russian Federation tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, is playing an increasingly important role for Moscow amid the growing complications for the Putin regime in the course of the war against Ukraine.
Belarus’s military-strategic role as a bridgehead for Russia and as a likely ally is growing. Amid the buildup of Russia war fatigue from the war in Ukraine, in 2026 a thorough and overt preparation of the Armed Forces of Belarus for war has been launched. Threats have noticeably increased both directly to Ukraine and to the countries of Europe – these are primarily linked to Russia being given the opportunity to carry out drone attacks from Belarus territory, as well as to the involvement of Belarus citizens in the war through contracts signed with the Ministry of Defense of Russia. However, the likelihood of Russia opening a second front by drawing Belarus into the war against Ukraine.
Introduction. Political Prerequisites for Rapprochement between Russia and Belarus
First and foremost, as of May 2026 Belarus remains a satellite of Russia – the most firmly embedded of all the countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the structure of the “Union State”.
Belarus’s critical dependence on Russian energy, financial assistance, and military support does not allow it to act independently on the international stage. An even more significant factor has been Putin’s personal support for the dictatorial regime established in Belarus and its leader. Therefore, Russia’s permission to use Belarus territory for conducting military operations against Ukraine in 2022, as well as the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in June 2023, became not merely a compromise, but a kind of repayment for the personal intervention of the head of Russia and the de facto preservation of Lukashenko’s regime in 2020. Putin’s Kremlin successfully seized the moment by supporting the crackdown on the opposition movement in Belarus, which threatened to topple a weakened Lukashenko – thanks to this, the head of Russia gained greater personal influence. Thanks to Putin, the Belarusian dictator was able to arrange the subsequent 2025 presidential election without much effort, since the country was left without an active opposition.
The consequences of the rapprochement with Russia were billions in loans and preferential agreements on the supply of Russian oil and gas.
In early 2025, the American Institute for the Study of War published the study “Russia’s Quiet Conquest: Belarus”. It argued that Russia is in the final stage of the de facto annexation of Belarus. Among other things, it stated that the Kremlin intends to use the population of Belarus to replenish Russia’s Armed Forces.
The author of the study, Institute for the Study of War analyst George Barros, is convinced that the military integration of Belarus is virtually complete. Russia seeks to establish a permanent base in Belarus not only for aviation, but also for new ground forces divisions.
Another of G. Barros’s points concerns the assessment of the implementation of political, economic, and military integration. In his view, military integration is virtually complete, and a decision on establishing a permanent base could be made in the near future.
As for economic integration – the Kremlin continues to develop roadmaps aimed at creating common markets for goods and resources: gas and electricity. Labor legislation is being developed to ensure the free movement of labor between Russia and Belarus – the introduction of these innovations will transform the two countries into a single integrated system.
Finally, political integration is the most complex area. It requires the creation of a Union State court, the formation of a joint parliament, and the transformation of the Standing Committee of the Union State into a functioning executive body with real powers.
New steps toward the de facto absorption of Belarus have already taken place during the full-scale war. Thus, in December 2024, in Minsk, dictators Putin and Lukashenko signed a Treaty on Security Guarantees. Experts point to the telling Article 5 of the agreement, which grants Russian armed forces the right to enter the territory of Belarus, including in the event of internal protests. Fulfillment of the obligations entails collective countermeasures against unilateral restrictive measures of an economic or other nature, the use by the parties of the potential of their relations with other states to prevent encroachments on security, and the taking of response measures “not only to acts of aggression that have been committed, but also to threats of their commission, as well as the immediate provision of the necessary military, military-technical, and other assistance”.
In addition, Belarus and Russia have equalized electoral rights for their citizens. The agreement concluded provides that Belarusian and Russian citizens permanently residing in the territory of the other state will be able to take part in local “elections”. Furthermore, Lukashenko and Putin signed an agreement on the “mutual protection of citizens” from “unfounded persecution by foreign governments and international judicial bodies”.
It is also important to mention that in late April 2024, the updated Military Doctrine of Belarus was officially published; the previous version had been in effect since 2016. It was approved on April 25, 2024, by a decision of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly at the first session of this “special representative body”. It was established in February 2022 following a pseudo-referendum and the introduction of the necessary amendments to the constitution of Belarus. This body is chaired by Lukashenko.
In the new Military Doctrine of Belarus, many provisions concerning Ukraine are declarative and propagandistic (in particular, regarding Belarus’s non-participation in military aggression). Experts note that as long as Russian troops, especially nuclear weapons, remain on the territory of Belarus, Belarus should be regarded as a military adversary of Ukraine, participating in armed aggression against our state. A fundamental feature of the new Military Doctrine of Belarus is the codification of new military threats to Ukraine. Above all, this concerns the possible direct involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces, together with the Russian Armed Forces, in waging a “coalition war” in Ukraine, ostensibly to “defend the Union State from aggression by a coalition of Western states”, including through the use of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.
Overall, Belarus is a very important territory for Russia – from here, the course of the war can be changed. No less important for Russia is the population of Belarus as a mobilization resource. Also significant for Russia is the political aspect – the presence of an ally is meant to signal to the world that Russia is not acting alone.
Military Cooperation between Belarus and Russia
Military cooperation between the two countries is at a high level: Russia and Belarus have created a unified joint military grouping and a unified military command. Experts believe that a plan for the deployment of this military grouping exists and has been agreed upon at the level of the heads of state.
Over the years, mechanisms have also been built for Russia’s control over the Belarusian air defense system – through the air defense commander of Russia’s Western Military District.
To develop combat coordination, Russia and Belarus have continually conducted joint military exercises, which were characterized by a telling feature – the de facto subordination of Belarusian troops to Russia’s Western Military District. Joint exercises between Russia and Belarus were suspended after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; however, in September 2025, Moscow and Minsk resumed joint military maneuvers – officially in order to practice joint actions within the framework of ensuring the military security of the so-called Union State and readiness to repel enemy aggression. It is important to emphasize that these exercises included simulated use of nuclear weapons and “Oreshnik” intermediate-range missiles to intimidate neighboring countries.
Experts point out that in the sphere of military cooperation, the human factor is of key importance. 90% of the senior command staff of the Belarusian army either received their education or underwent advanced training at Russian educational institutions. There are assessments suggesting that Moscow intends to use the population of Belarus to replenish its armed forces.
Experts insist that Putin is deliberately attempting to destroy the Belarusian army as an institution and to undermine its loyalty to Belarus. This concerns the erosion of security institutions in general, since Kremlin activity also affects other key security agencies of Belarus – the State Security Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Belarus often copies decisions made by Ukraine and Russia – for example, in June 2025, it created unmanned aerial systems forces.
The greatest joint activity has been recorded since the beginning of 2026. This refers to the continuous combat training of Belarusian troops with the assistance of Russian instructors. Russia is significantly reinforcing Belarus with air defense assets. Large-scale command-staff exercises have been conducted, the head of Belarus met with senior command staff and directly stated that preparations for war were underway.
Military-Technical Cooperation between Belarus and Russia and Its Role
The military-industrial complex of Belarus, as in Russia itself, has always remained an integral and significant part of the entire economy. In this regard, the Kremlin’s activity has always concerned two key components: keeping the military-industrial complex of Belarus fragmented and maintaining its dependence on Russia. During the full-scale war, Russia has sought to turn the economies of Belarus and Russia itself into a single system.
Although the military-industrial complex itself is trying to move along a trajectory of modernization and the expansion of competencies in developing new weapons, it is not self-sufficient. For example, in May 2026 the military-industrial complex developed an automation system for the BM-21 “Grad” and BM-27 “Uragan” multiple launch rocket systems; in February of this year – the “Kvadro-M” heavy bomber drone; and in 2025 – the “Fumigator-V” anti-drone electronic warfare system. But even such developments are unable to overcome the fragmentation of the defense industry.
The country’s weapons and military-industrial complex are increasingly controlled by Russia – both through orders and, with regard to weapons that have been transferred, through political pressure. At the same time, conditions have been created in which the Lukashenko regime has no choice, because the country’s economy is increasingly being subordinated to the military goals of Russia and its war.
For example, the most active enterprises – the Minsk-based Open Joint-Stock Company “Integral” and Open Joint-Stock Company “Tsvetotron” – manufacture electronics for cruise missiles. Components manufactured by Open Joint-Stock Company “Integral” have been found in Kh-69 and “Kinzhal” missiles, as well as in Kh-38 missiles used to attack civilians in Ukraine.
Whereas before the start of the full-scale war 99 Belarus companies supplied weapons or components to Russia, by 2025 at least 287 military-industrial complex enterprises of Belarus were producing weapons for the needs of Russia. According to experts’ estimates, Russia has invested approximately one and a half billion dollars in the military sector of Belarus’s economy – part of these funds has been spent on expanding the production of weapons and components.
Belarus is helping to replenish Russia’s losses in the war. For example, the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant supplies Russia with MZKT-7930 chassis for the “Pantsir-S” surface-to-air missile systems. In 2026, Belarus and Russia are to launch an ammunition plant in Belarus, with Russia among its main customers.
In turn, Russia sells “heavy” weapons to Belarus. In 2025, Belarus received six modern Su-30SM2 fighter jets from Russia, and this year – another new batch. In 2024, Belarus received another battery of “Tor-M2” surface-to-air missile systems, and in 2023 and 2025 – four new Mi-35M helicopters.
The Lukashenko regime is increasingly forced to militarize the Belarusian economy. In particular, Belarusian machine building is in a state of deep crisis, since on its main sales market – Russia – it is being pushed out by China, while in Europe its products cannot withstand competition.
Assessment of Russia’s Possibilities for Using Belarus for Military Purposes
Overall, experts point to the strengthening of Belarus’s defense potential; in particular, a set of measures has been implemented aimed at developing a military scenario. They note investments in new weapons, the strengthening of military infrastructure – the so-called “Khrenin Line”, ideological and legislative conditioning, digital mobilization, and consideration of the possibility of conscripting prisoners. The construction of roads toward Ukraine, as well as artillery positions for firing on Ukraine, is described as dangerous. Experts have calculated that in Belarus military spending has increased by 32%; the reserve period for petroleum products has been extended from 15 to 30 days; the mobilization reserve is estimated at 289,000 people; territorial defense forces numbering 150,000 people have been established; the Armed Forces of Belarus itself, currently numbering 60,000–65,000 people, are planned to be increased to 85,000, with 50% of military personnel planned to be transferred to contract service; over the past year, 4,600 new weapons were procured for the Armed Forces of Belarus. In addition, a Southern Operational Command has been created, and the Special Operations Forces of Belarus are permanently stationed near the border with Ukraine. The Ministry of Emergency Situations constantly conducts inspections of the Civil Defense Forces, including training for actions in the event of bombing.
Observers have noted provocative flights of military helicopters along the border with Ukraine. In early May of this year, a balloon equipped with a drone repeater flew from the territory of Belarus into Ukrainian territory, which is described as a typical tool of Minsk’s hybrid pressure on neighboring states.
Over the past year, such objects or drones have been regularly detected in the airspace of the Baltic states and Poland. In particular, in 2025 Polish border guards recorded approximately 200 such incidents. For Lithuania, the problem has also taken on a systemic character: by the end of 2025, the number of balloons that had flown in from Belarus reached 623, after which the country’s government declared a state of emergency.
Individual cases posed threats to civil aviation – weather balloons flew over key airports, forcing the temporary closure of airfields and delays to flights. Although balloons are usually used for transporting contraband, the militaries of EU and NATO countries regard them primarily as a tool for reconnaissance and for testing the response of air defense systems.
Significant steps toward war preparation were taken by dictator Lukashenko in April of this year. In addition to the aforementioned infrastructure preparation, it is also worth taking into account the decree issued on the conscription of reserve officers into the Armed Forces and border services. In particular, men under the age of 27 from among reserve officers who have not completed compulsory military service or service in the armed forces reserve, are subject to conscription. However, behind the “increase in manning levels” lies an intention both to conduct information conditioning of the population and to carry out real preparation of the mobilization reserve. Manipulations, in particular the absence of any mention of the number of reserve officers to be conscripted, betray an intention to create artificial tension in society.
The threat of Belarus being drawn back into the Russian-Ukrainian war and of an expansion of the combat zone had acquired new, more distinct contours.
Pavel Latushko, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, acknowledges that Belarus is now more ready for war than ever before. He particularly emphasized that the new Military Doctrine of Belarus provides for a preemptive strike in the event of a “threat to Belarus”. And a controlled body – the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly – could, in turn, adopt a decision on providing assistance to an ally. Latushko believes that the Special Operations Forces of Belarus could, under certain conditions, be drawn into the war against Ukraine. At the same time, the involvement of the Special Operations Forces of Belarus is an extreme option for dictator Lukashenko, who fears the reaction to the deaths of Belarusians in the war.
Despite the set of measures taken by the head of Belarus to strengthen its military potential, the Belarusian army is not ready for full-scale combat operations and remains relatively weak. At the same time, for Russia the priority task is to draw Belarus into the war in order to use the country’s units for large-scale provocations and to create a zone of tension in northern Ukraine.
Incidentally, the bellicose rhetoric of official Minsk emerged precisely as Russia itself faced increasing problems on the front – as a supporting factor in attempts to overcome existing difficulties. The use of Belarus for developing hybrid scenarios is possible both with regard to Ukraine and with regard to the Baltic states or Poland.
At the same time, an analysis of Lukashenko’s own activity and behavior provides grounds to assert his persistent unwillingness to join Putin’s adventure – especially against the backdrop of improving relations with the West, primarily with the United States. The prospect of sanctions being lifted from Belarusian companies is directly linked to the continuation of his own rule, whereas being drawn into the war could bring the end of his regime closer.
However, since Belarus is a state dependent on Russia and is in fact under the control of the Kremlin, a repetition of the scenario of an offensive or periodic attacks from Belarus territory is entirely possible. It cannot be ruled out that hybrid attacks would be more advantageous for Russia in terms of accomplishing the task of drawing Belarus into the war – in this way, the use of small forces could achieve significant dispersion of the efforts of Ukraine’s Defense Forces: an even greater length of front line and the need to use more weapons and personnel.
Moreover, the head of Belarus cannot fail to take into account the mood within the country. According to opinion polls, 90% of Belarusians do not want Belarus to participate in the war against Ukraine. Lukashenko himself fears any forceful scenario for Belarus, and overall there are views that the dictator is in a state of panic – due to fear of sabotage and an internal blow to the regime.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The use of Belarus territory for military purposes against Ukraine is entirely possible – primarily as a result of Lukashenko minimizing his own agency. However, for a large-scale Russia offensive from Belarus territory, certain prerequisites must be met: a large-scale invasion from the north must be preceded by the appearance on Belarus territory of a large number of Russian troops, since Belarus will refuse to act independently. This has not yet been observed, and Lukashenko’s bellicose rhetoric is linked more to pressure on him from Putin than to a desire to support Russia army and fulfill the terms of the agreement with Moscow. An important nuance is also the fact that the peak of threats occurred in April, while in May the issue of the “Belarusian front” faded into the background – this can be linked to the undeniable successes of Ukraine’s Defense Forces in the theater of operations and even to a certain confusion in the Kremlin ahead of May 9.
The Kremlin has created conditions for more substantiated and more powerful pressure on Belarus and will try to use against Ukraine, if not Belarus’s forces as a whole, then individual units. The implementation of such scenarios is facilitated by the crisis within NATO and the general moment of weakness in the Western camp. Indeed, Russia itself has limited capabilities for deploying a full-fledged front, and in this case the Belarusian contribution would prove insignificant. Therefore, it appears that the Kremlin could derive greater benefit from using Belarus as an auxiliary, hybrid element in the war, rather than as a base for new offensive operations from the north.
It can be predicted that providing territory and infrastructure, and possibly also agreeing to allow Belarusians to be drawn into voluntarily signing contracts with the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as, probably, the use of prisoners. The use of units remains a much more open question, since this is already associated with risks to the power and life of the Minsk dictator. However, some experts believe that the use of individual units, such as the Special Operations Forces of Belarus, which in total number from 12,000 to 20,000 personnel and are generally inclined toward such a scenario, is entirely possible.
It cannot be ruled out that Putin’s Kremlin is counting on “a retaliatory strike by Ukraine” in response to provocations involving border crossings, the use of drones from Belarus territory, or even shelling. Given that conditions for carrying out large-scale provocations are being actively created, they should be expected.
The minimum plan for the Kremlin would be to tie down reserves of Ukraine’s Defense Forces near the border with Belarus, while the maximum plan would be a military response by Ukraine to hybrid aggression.
The fact of the presence on Belarus territory of the “Oreshnik” intermediate-range missile system and Russian tactical nuclear weapons deserves separate attention – this concerns the possibility of using such weapons as a means of deterring a military response by Ukraine in the event that Belarus territory is used by Russia for a repeated attack on Ukraine. The actual use of such weapons is unlikely.
As for the recommendations, it is quite obvious that the political, informational, and purely military dimensions need to be considered.
At the political level, it would be advisable to work through the platforms of international organizations, primarily the United Nations, as well as NATO and the EU; a separate appeal to the United States, which has its own level of influence over Minsk, would also be logical – with arguments and calls for additional pressure on the Kremlin and for placing full responsibility for steps toward expanding the war in Europe. After all, formally, for the world, the war is between Russia and Ukraine, whereas pushing Belarus toward war becomes a dangerous step toward increasing the number of combatant countries and, in effect, a step toward a Third World War. The overall political rhetoric should restrain Lukashenko, first and foremost, from providing his troops for joint military attacks with Russia, and secondly, from providing his territory for an offensive by Russian troops. Important in this context would be to accelerate work with partners in Europe toward the creation and full launch of a special international tribunal for investigating the crime of Russia aggression and holding the highest leadership of Russia accountable, including Vladimir Putin.
The informational dimension should include pragmatic pressure on Lukashenko – a clear explanation, through public statements by politicians and diplomats, as well as through the media, of which steps by Belarus Ukraine will be forced to respond to militarily and which targets will be struck. As a proposal, one could note a layered approach to striking targets: first – Russian facilities in Belarus, both in the event of border crossings and an offensive, and in the event of missile and drone attacks; second – in the event of the involvement of Belarus units – both the units themselves and military facilities of Belarus. There should be a systematic information campaign whose narratives are aimed directly at the head of Belarus – with the goal of creating an understanding of his personal responsibility for Belarus’s participation in the war against Ukraine. Ukraine’s exceptional fire capabilities for striking targets throughout the entire theater of operations should be emphasized. Belarusian servicemen must understand that their crossing of the Ukrainian border will be recognized as an act of aggression, after which Belarus will become a legitimate target. The Defense Forces will strike military and industrial facilities. Lukashenko himself must clearly understand, in the course of the campaign, that if he joins Putin’s war he, too, automatically becomes a target.
Separately, it would be advisable to conduct an information campaign aimed at servicemen of Belarus – with the goal of drawing a distinction between the troops and the authorities, who are irresponsibly leading the people toward catastrophe. The goal of such a campaign is to foster among servicemen of Belarus an awareness of their own vulnerability and of the wrongness of being drawn into a deadly war. Furthermore, it would be useful to refer to – and possibly record and disseminate – a series of appeals by soldiers of the Kalinoŭski Regiment – the Army of Free Belarus – calling for the mass transfer of Belarusian servicemen into its ranks and for the struggle for the European future of Belarus.
As for the military dimension, the following set of actions is proposed, aimed at the maximum possible demonstration of Ukraine’s preparedness for a confrontation on the border with Belarus.
First. Develop and intensify approaches for continuous monitoring and targeted reconnaissance of the movement of equipment in Belarus and the creation of military infrastructure facilities. Compile a list and establish a hierarchy of targets on Belarus territory if the capabilities of unmanned systems are employed.
Second. Reinforce mine and engineering obstacles along the entire border with Belarus. Begin work on creating unmanned automated defense lines using unmanned aerial complexes, ground robotic complexes, automated control systems, and electronic warfare assets.
Third. Turn border sections into areas for the recovery and replenishment of Defense Forces units, and demonstrate a significant troop presence on the border with Belarus through units that are de facto resting and conducting combat-readiness training measures.
The publication is prepared under the project “Strengthening the Analytical Capabilities of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making with the Civil Society” of the Centre for International Security with the support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ukraine.
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