FROM SMALL ALLIANCES TO NETWORK DIPLOMACY: PROMISING FORMATS FOR UKRAINE’S ENGAGEMENT WITH PARTNERS IN 2026-2030

Sergiy Gerasymchuk, Volodymyr-Nazarii Havrish, Rostyslav Klimov, Yuliia Nevmerzhytska

Experts of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

Introduction

The dynamics of recent years have demonstrated the weakening of the mechanisms of international law and of the effectiveness of the international formats and organizations called upon to ensure its observance. Although international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) remain viable platforms for political declarations, and for drawing attention to Russian crimes against Ukraine and its citizens, the effectiveness of their response is increasingly minimal and largely verbal.

Among the reasons (alongside Russian influence and “veto” players) is the emergence of parallel structures reflecting the desire of states beyond North America and Europe to assert their agency. The emergence of such structures is usually driven by major players, notably the People’s Republic of China, to advance their own agenda and demonstrate a claim to a bipolar world system.

At the same time, small and medium-sized states are increasingly resorting to the formation of small alliances. The nature of such alliances varies: they may be geared toward achieving specific security, economic, energy, or logistical goals; serve as an instrument for balancing amid the confrontation of major players; or perform applied and strategic functions simultaneously, thereby expanding the room for political maneuver under the constrained capacities of global associations.

In a number of such formats Ukraine is an observer, partner, or associated member. In some cases it has acted as an initiator and co-founder. Assessing the effectiveness of existing regional groupings and the potential of new ones is the task of this analytical paper.

• political viability, understood as a combination of long-term shared political interests and the absence of “veto” players, and a stable governmental foreign policy course;
• security potential – the added value of security and defense cooperation and of defense-industry interaction;
• economic potential – the existence of formats of cooperation that will outweigh competition and generate added economic value;
• the realistic prospect of growing momentum of cooperation within the format in the period up to 2030.

Audit of Existing Formats

A format worth attention in view of its rich history of interaction with Ukraine is the Visegrád Four (V4). It is a format of regional coordination in Central Europe, established in 1991 to support the democratic transformation of the countries of the region and their integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The V4 comprises Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.

After the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression in 2022, Poland and the Czech Republic were among Ukraine’s key military and political partners, whereas Hungary took a far more restrained position, blocking certain decisions of the EU and NATO on support for Ukraine. Slovakia, following its change of government in 2023, likewise shifted to a more skeptical policy on military assistance to Kyiv, as did the Czech Republic after its change of government in 2025.

The most recent top-level political contact was the prime ministers’ summit in Gödöllő (Hungary) on June 23, 2026.

Arguments in favor of strengthening cooperation with the grouping include factors such as Ukraine’s geographic proximity; Poland’s historically key role as an advocate of Ukrainian integration; and the existence of established cooperation mechanisms through the International Visegrad Fund.

Hence the format’s political prospects are average. At the same time, the question of support for Ukraine remains one of the main sources of disagreement among the format’s participants.

Security prospects are assessed as low. Although Poland is one of Europe’s most powerful military states and one of Ukraine’s key security partners, the other V4 countries have far smaller military potential and do not demonstrate the same level of readiness to provide military support to Ukraine.

Economic prospects, however, are high. The combined GDP of the Visegrád Four countries exceeds $1.8 trillion, and the integration of their economies into the EU single market creates considerable potential for drawing Ukraine into production chains and postwar reconstruction.

The situation looks more promising with the format Bucharest Nine (B9) + Ukraine (Poland – Romania – Lithuania – Latvia – Estonia – the Czech Republic – Slovakia – Hungary – Bulgaria). The Bucharest Nine (B9) is a format of regional security coordination among the states of NATO’s eastern flank, established in 2015 at the initiative of the presidents of Poland and Romania. The format’s main purpose at its creation was to strengthen political interaction among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014.

After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the importance of the Bucharest Nine grew substantially. The format’s states became some of the leading advocates of a stronger NATO military presence on the eastern flank, higher defense budgets, and support for Ukraine.

Among the grouping’s priorities: air defense and early warning; countering hybrid threats; maritime security of the Black Sea; Ukraine’s integration into the security system of the eastern flank; and support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

Despite this, the format’s political prospects are above average. The B9 is one of the most favorable formats for deepening political cooperation, since most of its participants share a common view of the Russian threat. The main obstacle remains the need to align positions with the states that take a more cautious approach, above all Hungary.

Security prospects are high. The format brings together NATO states that are located in the immediate vicinity of Russia and Belarus.

Economic prospects are high. The B9’s combined GDP of more than $2.5 trillion, its integration into the EU, and its considerable infrastructure potential create opportunities for drawing Ukraine into regional production chains, transport networks, and reconstruction projects.

A potentially high-quality umbrella structure for high-level political dialogue is Weimar+ (+ Ukraine). The Weimar Triangle was established in 1991 as a format of political cooperation among France, Germany, and Poland. Its initial purpose was to facilitate Poland’s European integration after the end of the Cold War.

After the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the format acquired new strategic significance. The Weimar+ concept emerged, envisaging the expansion of the classic Weimar Triangle by bringing Ukraine and other key European states. Weimar+ includes not only France, Germany, and Poland but also such states as Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK), as well as representatives of the institutions of the European Union.

The first large-scale consultations in the Weimar+ format took place on February 12, 2025, in Paris. The format’s development continued in London in May 2025.

Weimar+ has limited prospects as a practical format for Ukraine’s security interaction with partners. At the same time, the real influence of Weimar+ remains limited by the absence of a permanent institutional structure, mechanisms for joint decision-making, and concrete instruments for implementing agreements. Most practical steps to support Ukraine are carried out through bilateral channels, the EU, or NATO rather than within the format itself. Moreover, differences persist among the participants over the pace of military assistance, the role of the United States in European security, and the possible deployment of European military forces.

Lublin Triangle (Ukraine–Lithuania–Poland) is one of the most developed and institutionalized regional formats. The Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade has existed for more than 10 years.

On September 11, 2025, the participants promptly adopted a joint statement on the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace, demonstrating the format’s capacity for rapid political coordination.

Political coordination is reinforced by mutual treaty obligations among the states under the bilateral security agreements Ukraine concluded with Poland (July 8, 2024) and Lithuania (June 27, 2024).

Development priorities include countering hybrid threats (cybersecurity, combating the Russian “shadow fleet”), air defense coordination and early warning, promotion of energy security, military training, and support for Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Hence the format’s political prospects are moderately high, given the stable security consensus of the current governments, but sensitive to Poland’s 2027 elections. Security prospects are likewise high, given the potential for air defense coordination and countering hybrid threats. Economic potential, by contrast, is moderate and concentrated mainly in logistics and energy.

Odesa Triangle (Ukraine–Moldova–Romania) is a relatively young format that emerged in Odesa in 2022 and was officially renamed at the fourth ministerial meeting on August 8, 2025, in Chernivtsi.

Priority areas include the security of the Black Sea and the Danube, protection of port and border infrastructure, energy resilience, countering hybrid threats, development of transport corridors, and coordination of the European integration of Ukraine and Moldova.

The format’s political prospects are therefore moderate, given the dependence on the domestic stability of Moldova and Romania. Security potential is moderate but important in the Black Sea and Danube dimensions. Economic potential is moderately high thanks to logistics, energy, and border infrastructure. At the same time, the prospect of growing momentum of cooperation within the format is increasing, even though the “Odesa Triangle” does not yet have a permanent executive structure.

Three Seas Initiative is a format in which Ukraine’s relations show substantial momentum. Ukraine has moved from “a partner of the Initiative beginning the participation process” (June 2022, Riga) to “an associated participating state” (September 2023, Bucharest). Associated partnership has opened the possibility for Ukraine to include its own projects in the agenda and the list of priority infrastructure of the Three Seas Initiative.

At the most recent summit in April 2026 in Croatia, Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko presented infrastructure proposals: the creation of capacity for reverse gas supplies into Ukrainian underground storage facilities, and a dedicated window for Ukrainian projects in the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund.

Thus, the project’s political viability is high, though complicated by the heterogeneity of participants’ interests. Its security role is moderate since the Three Seas Initiative can indirectly strengthen NATO’s eastern flank through dual-use infrastructure. Economic potential is high thanks to transport, energy, and digital projects. The realistic prospect of growing momentum in relations through 2030 is moderate, since Ukraine’s status is limited and access to financing is not guaranteed.

Quadriga (Ukraine – Türkiye) is a format of strategic political dialogue between Ukraine and Türkiye, launched in 2020 as a mechanism of regular consultations between the two states’ ministers of foreign affairs and defense.

The military-technological partnership is of particular importance for bilateral relations. The Turkish company Baykar has established production ties with Ukraine in the field of unmanned systems, and Ukrainian enterprises take part in joint defense projects.

Türkiye, however, seeks to preserve a balance in its relations with Russia. Hence the format has a low level of prospects. The Quadriga format itself has not been sufficiently institutionalized. An additional constraint is Türkiye’s multi-vector foreign policy, which seeks simultaneously to preserve strategic partnership with its NATO allies and to maintain working relations with Russia.

The UK–Poland–Ukraine format dates back to the trilateral statement proclaimed in February 2022 and focused on cybersecurity, energy security, and countering disinformation. Subsequently, however, it developed mainly as two parallel bilateral tracks. Ukraine and the United Kingdom concluded the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement on January 16, 2025, and, on March 17, 2026, a declaration on deepening cooperation in security and the defense industry.

On May 27, 2026, the United Kingdom and Poland concluded a Treaty on partnership in security and defense, covering in particular the joint development of missile systems, air defense, ammunition, and counter-drone capabilities.

Hence political prospects are moderately high, given the shared perception of the Russian threat, but sensitive to Poland’s 2027 elections and a possible strengthening of right-wing forces. Security potential is high in air defense, missile technologies, cybersecurity, and the defense industry. The realistic prospect of growing momentum in relations is moderate, since the strong bilateral tracks are not yet united by a permanent trilateral mechanism, while multilateral cooperation is concentrated in alternative formats.

Promising Formats

Despite the unsuccessful attempts to launch the Ukraine–UK–Poland format as a political grouping, its potential should not be underestimated, resting as it does on the functional complementarity of the three states. Poland offers an assembly, repair, and logistics base close to Ukraine, access to the EU market. Ukraine provides combat experience, a rapid cycle of system development and testing, and competencies in drones, electronic warfare (EW), ammunition, and software.

Political prospects are moderately high, since the parties share a perception of the Russian threat, but the trilateral mechanism still lags behind the bilateral tracks in its development. Security prospects are high thanks to the potential for joint production of missiles, ammunition, unmanned systems, air defense assets, and EW. The realistic prospect is moderately high: what is needed is the institutionalization of already existing bilateral projects into a joint trilateral format.

On the Baltic track, a promising format is NB8+Ukraine (Denmark – Estonia – Finland – Iceland – Latvia – Lithuania – Norway – Sweden). The Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) is a format of regional cooperation between the five Nordic states and the three Baltic states.

After 2022, the format’s importance grew substantially owing to the intensification of the Russian military threat, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, and the need to protect the Alliance’s northern and eastern flanks.

Ukraine is not a member of the NB8, but after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion the format began actively developing cooperation with Kyiv. The most recent large-scale meeting in the NB8 format with the participation of the president of Ukraine took place on June 9, 2026, in Tallinn (Estonia); based on its results, a joint declaration was signed consolidating the deepening of security and defense cooperation.

A distinctive feature of NB8+Ukraine is that this format has its greatest potential precisely in cybersecurity, digital resilience, and countering hybrid threats, since the Nordic and Baltic countries are among the world’s most digitally advanced states.

That said, the NB8 is one of the most favorable formats for Ukraine from a political standpoint. Most of the format’s states hold a clear position on the need to deter Russia and support Ukraine, since they themselves are in the immediate vicinity of the Russian military space.

The security prospects of NB8+Ukraine are very high, especially in cybersecurity, countering hybrid threats, and defense technologies. A separate promising area is cooperation in unmanned systems. Ukraine has unique practical experience of the mass use of drones in modern war, while the NB8 countries possess considerable technological, industrial, and innovation capabilities.

Economic prospects are average, since the NB8’s scale is smaller than that of other formats. The format’s main advantage lies not in the scale of its economies but in the high level of technological development, innovation, and competencies in digitalization and defense technologies.

Ukraine–Poland–Romania Triangle looks promising, considering that Poland and Romania form Ukraine’s two complementary logistics arms: a northern one – with access to the Baltic Sea and Central Europe, and a southern one – via the Danube, the Black Sea, and the port of Constanța. Both states are key countries of NATO’s eastern flank and are building up their defense capabilities.

The format’s complementarity lies in the possibility of combining Polish air defense systems and northern supply routes, Romanian aviation, Danube, and Black Sea infrastructure, and Ukrainian combat experience in countering missiles and drones. Practical areas could include the exchange of radar information, regional early warning, joint procurement of counter-UAV assets, coordination of the protection of logistics hubs.

Thus, political prospects are moderately high thanks to the shared interests of the eastern flank, although they are lowered by political fluctuations in Romania and disputes with Poland. Security potential is high owing to air defense, early warning, and military mobility. At the same time, building on the existing bilateral agreements, the format could well demonstrate high momentum in the development of cooperation.

Another promising format appears to be the Türkiye–Bulgaria–Romania–Ukraine grouping. At present, Ukraine already has a large cooperation format that includes these three countries, known as the Maritime Capability Coalition, which was established in 2023 and concentrates mostly on strengthening the Ukrainian Navy.

At the same time, a more independent format without Ukraine’s direct participation also exists. Since January 2024, Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria have been part of the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group, which works jointly to ensure the uninterrupted movement of maritime commercial and civilian traffic along the Black Sea coast of these three countries, as well as on the preparation and training of mine clearance crews. It is also preliminarily known that Ukraine is set to be admitted to the coalition immediately after the end of the war. Joining such a coalition will facilitate the demining of the Ukrainian part of the Black Sea by allied forces.

Under such conditions, the prospects for political momentum are moderate, given the political uncertainty in Bulgaria’s political arena and the unstable government situation in Romania. Security prospects are high, given the existence of a real threat from the Russian Federation and the awareness of this threat among the partners from the grouping’s states. Economic prospects are moderately high.

An interesting area in which a window of opportunity is opening is the Black Sea–Caspian region. Cooperation among the states of the region is largely fragmented and rests mainly on bilateral formats of interaction. At the same time, Azerbaijan, at the very least, is interested in the security of the Black Sea no less than in that of the Caspian Sea.

After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan turned into a notable trading partner of the EU, especially in the energy sphere, where the Southern Gas Corridor project is actively developing; green energy is also being developed jointly with the EU. And this comes against the backdrop of continued pragmatic cooperation with Ukraine and a cooling in relations between Baku and Moscow.

With Nikol Pashinyan’s victory in the recent parliamentary elections and the return of Armenia to a pro-European course, engagement with this Caucasus state is also promising, as it gradually restores ties with Azerbaijan and Türkiye following the achievement of peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. Given the changed geopolitical situation, a window of opportunity is also opening in Armenia’s relations both with Ukraine and with its other neighbors.

The format of Black Sea–Caspian cooperation involving these states has the potential to coordinate general Black Sea security issues and can help develop systems of maritime and air surveillance, protection of critical and energy infrastructure, the fight against the Russian shadow fleet, and countering hybrid threats and cyberattacks, without thereby turning into a full-fledged military alliance. For the format to succeed, however, it must concentrate on institutionalizing a regular dialogue of the six parties (Türkiye–Bulgaria–Romania–Ukraine–Azerbaijan–Armenia), guided first and foremost by pragmatic rather than idealistic principles of cooperation.

The formation of such structures is promising in trade and economic terms and would be able to facilitate the development of electricity interconnectors between the Caucasus and the Black Sea region, expand the supply of energy resources from Asia to Europe.

The political prospects of this track are moderately low, owing to the persistence of the problems of the Türkiye–Bulgaria–Romania–Ukraine format and the addition to them of the no less problematic Azerbaijan and Armenia. Security prospects are high thanks to the combination of the Black Sea and South Caucasus security dimensions, though one must recognize the defense limitations and the risks of renewed escalations in Azerbaijani–Armenian relations. Overall realism is moderate, because the format has considerable value in the security and economic dimensions but will depend on the political will of all participating states and on political progress in the South Caucasus.

Recommendations

The audit of existing regional groupings and the assessment of the prospects of potential ones indicate that, although such formats are no substitute for global formats and international organizations, they have added value and can help solve tactical tasks. Thus, cooperation in regional groupings can be viewed as an incubator of ideas that over time can be implemented in broader formats of cooperation.

To give impetus to selected promising formats, it appears appropriate to take the following comprehensive steps:

In Economic and Infrastructure Spheres

A testing ground for intensifying cooperation could be the Odesa Triangle. An important step within the format could be the creation of an end-to-end mechanism for exchanging advance data on the Reni–Giurgiulești–Galați route. The customs, border, port, and phytosanitary authorities of the three states would simultaneously receive an agreed set of data on the cargo, the results of completed inspections. This would make it possible to avoid re-entering information and to reduce idle time at every section of the route.

In addition, within the format it is possible to create a winter mechanism of rapid energy assistance, combining the already existing capacities for imports and emergency electricity supply with a reserve of repair equipment and simplified logistics. In parallel, it is worth forming a joint reserve of transformers, mobile substations, generators, cables, and other critical equipment in Romania or Moldova, and determining in advance the routes and documents for its urgent transportation to Ukraine after attacks.

In Security Sphere

An impetus for raising the momentum of relations in regional groupings, especially those with a pronounced security potential, could come from dedicated competitions for small and medium-sized defense and technology enterprises. A mandatory condition of participation would be the formation of consortia from at least three states of such groupings. A pilot run of such competitions could be launched within the Lublin Triangle Economic Forum.

Another pilot format that can be tested within the Lublin Triangle is the exchange of air threat warnings. It could combine Ukrainian experience in tracking the trajectories of missiles and drones, Polish airborne early warning assets, and Lithuanian ground-based radar infrastructure.

A format of cooperation that could reinvigorate cooperation in the Ukraine – United Kingdom – Poland triangle could be the launch of a joint procedure under which Ukrainian defense developments would not undergo identical trials separately in each country. Ukraine would test systems in real combat conditions, Poland – their technical safety, compatibility, and suitability for serial production, and the United Kingdom – their compliance with procurement requirements.

Directly within the B9, it is advisable for Ukraine to propose launching a separate annual B9+Ukraine summit. This would consolidate Ukraine’s permanent participation in consultations on the security of NATO’s eastern flank and shift the current ad hoc interaction into a more institutionalized format.

It is also worth creating a joint B9–Ukraine working group on air defense, which could deal with the exchange of data on air threats, the integration of early warning systems, and the analysis of the use of Russian missiles and UAVs.

Ukraine can put forward an initiative to form a consortium of B9 defense industry enterprises for the production of ammunition, first-person-view drones, EW assets, and short-range air defense systems, and to launch multinational exercises involving Ukraine and the B9 countries to practice repelling mass UAV attacks, protecting critical infrastructure.

Beyond the security initiatives mentioned above, attention should also be paid to strengthening the Black Sea and Baltic tracks of cooperation and network diplomacy.

On Black Sea Track:

1. Development and implementation of radar technologies along the Black Sea coast. This is an important component of detecting and warning of Russian missile and drone attacks both on Ukraine and on the countries of Europe.
2. The second relevant track is the environmental one. The consequences of hostilities significantly affect the environmental situation in the Black Sea and on its coasts. The drift of sea mines is already a matter of attention for the Mine Countermeasures Task Group, but there is still no multilateral mechanism specifically for assessing the environmental consequences of the war.
3. The third track is joint work on the development and integration of infrastructure and energy corridors between Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye. It is now important to implement, as quickly as possible, the construction of European-gauge railways to Ukrainian ports, which will connect us infrastructurally to our Black Sea neighbors. It will also be no less important to complete the construction of the Vertical Gas Corridor.

On Baltic Track:

Propose to the NB8 countries a permanent platform for cooperation among government computer emergency response teams, military cyber units, and incident response centers.

1. In addition, Ukraine could propose creating a joint center for the development of strike UAVs, naval drones, and counter-drone systems.
2. Introduce a program of exchanges of cybersecurity specialists between the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and the cyber centers of the NB8 countries.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that not all multilateral formats are equally effective in advancing Ukrainian interests. In particular, bilateral formats such as the Quadriga, despite considerable potential, have failed to turn into effective mechanisms of political coordination.

In this connection, it is advisable to maintain the priority of developing bilateral relations with key partners. At the same time, multilateral formats should be used as an instrument of political coordination and promotion of Ukrainian interests at the regional level, rather than as the main mechanism for implementing practical cooperation.

The publication is prepared under the project “Strengthening the Analytical Capabilities of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making with the Civil Society” of the Centre for International Security with the support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ukraine.

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