AFRICAN VECTOR OF GLOBAL POLITICS: INTERESTS OF KEY ACTORS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE
Marta Oliynyk-D’omochko, Yurii Oliinyk, Anatolii Maksymov
Experts of the Center for African Studies
Summary
In 2026, Africa became the main arena of competition between global centers of influence. The countries of the continent are adapting to this struggle, balancing among the interests of external players for the sake of their own development. This brief analyzes the strategies of the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, China, and Russia, and identifies opportunities for strengthening Ukraine’s presence in the region.
Transformation of American Strategy in Africa
As of 2026, US policy in Africa has transformed into a “transactional model” based on pragmatic exchange: support for investment and security in return for access to critical resources and loyalty in the global confrontation. This shift is reinforced by a change in the institutional architecture, notably the restructuring of the United States Agency for International Development and the abandonment of “non-reciprocal preferences” in the trade regime of the African Growth and Opportunity Act. At the same time, the toolkit is oriented toward direct returns for the American economy.
In the extractive sector, the implementation of this strategy proceeds through a “dealmaking approach” aimed at deconstructing the monopoly of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Washington acts as a diplomatic mediator in conflicts in order to unlock access to strategic assets for American companies. A similar strategy of flexible pragmatism is also applied to South Africa, where Washington is purposefully consolidating control over extractive chains, minimizing the space for Beijing’s expansion.
With the same aim, Washington pragmatically weaves national interests into the global architecture of the Group of Seven (G7), notably the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) initiative, while securing control over key nodes for American corporations. The flagship project in this context is the Lobito Corridor – the modernization of 1,300 km of railways and port infrastructure in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia for the export of minerals. In addition, the US is implementing its strategy of influence in Africa through a number of other programs in the areas of the “green” energy transition (South Africa, Kenya) and institutional facilitation (through support for the Africa Virtual Investment Platform).
Washington’s systematic activity is underpinned by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, whose portfolio focuses on hub countries: Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya. Beyond these countries, by investing in energy (Sierra Leone, Gabon) and logistics, the corporation integrates American capital into key network assets, turning them into a platform for the dominance of American standards. Strategic investments in regional digital platforms allow the US to introduce its own technological standards and control key data transmission nodes, limiting the influence of competitors.
At the same time, three factors constrain the US strategy. The first is high political dependence on the situation in Washington: changes of administration or shifting priorities often lead to the freezing of projects, which reduces the trust of African partners. The aggressive rhetoric of certain political leaders is an additional destabilizing factor. The second is strict compliance requirements and regulatory restrictions, which narrow access to tenders for external players and slow project implementation compared with the PRC’s directive methods. The third is that the US role in Africa has been reduced to attempts to seize the initiative from competitors. This puts Washington in a weaker position: instead of setting the rules of the game, it is forced to “embed itself” in systems where China has already established its logistical and technological standards.
The changing political situation in the Sahel and the arrival of the Trump administration have driven a number of key changes in the US military sphere in Africa. The first concerns the scaling up of counterterrorism operations under the United States Africa Command, particularly in Somalia and Nigeria. The second change concerns the relocation of infrastructure and part of the activity to Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria after the loss of access to bases in the Sahel. In addition, the completion in January 2026 of the expansion of the Manda Bay base (Kenya) has substantially strengthened US capabilities for air monitoring and power projection in East Africa. The third change is that the US actively uses military diplomacy – from joint exercises with representatives of the opposing sides in Libya to non-public contacts of the Africa Command in the Sahel – in order to seize the initiative from competitors and restore influence over the region’s security architecture.
Given strict US protectionism, Ukraine’s direct integration into African projects through official tenders is rather unlikely due to regulatory restrictions on the origin of services. A realistic strategy for Ukraine lies in positioning itself as an engineering subcontractor for American prime contractors, particularly at the stage of calculating and designing complex mining and beneficiation processes. Another possible option is engaging Ukrainian specialists with experience in operating critical infrastructure under conditions of security instability. Their unique experience of working in a high-risk environment gives projects high operational resilience, making it possible to maintain critical infrastructure amid acute instability of logistics and communications.
Infrastructure and Security Architecture of EU Policy in Africa
For the EU, the African vector is critical for ensuring security and social stability on its own southern flank. Brussels’ toolkit is aimed at eliminating the root causes of migration – the absence of legal economic opportunities and constant security threats – notably through Global Gateway investments and financial support under the European Peace Facility. These measures also serve the function of geopolitical deterrence and the strengthening of the EU’s own positions.
The Global Gateway initiative is positioned as a high-quality alternative to Chinese expansion. Thanks to its financial architecture and the Team Europe approach, Brussels is mobilizing up to €150 billion, using risk-guarantee mechanisms. The strategic focus is concentrated on four key modules: digitalization, climate and energy, transport, and healthcare and education, which strengthen the EU’s humanitarian influence.
The EU’s orientation toward energy, logistics, and critical resources is a strategic response to the monopolization of these areas by the PRC, which threatens Europe’s industrial future and the success of the “Green Deal”. For example, in the energy sphere, the Africa–EU Green Energy initiative is being implemented with the aim of reaching 50 gigawatts of renewable energy sources by 2030. Through the creation of transregional energy systems, the EU seeks to integrate Africa’s energy potential into its own grid, turning the continent into a stable supplier for European industry. This is a way to offset dependence on external energy sources and to entrench the region’s technological attachment to EU standards.
However, the EU seeks to implement an approach distinct from the simple export of raw materials. The EU offers countries (for example, Namibia, the DRC, Zambia, and Rwanda, with which relevant memoranda have been concluded) an alternative, focusing on building up local processing industries. This allows African countries to retain a share of added value within their economies, which corresponds to the goals of the continent’s countries.
In the infrastructure sphere, the EU’s cooperation with the African Union on 12 strategic corridors is a key instrument for entrenching European capital in the continent’s logistics. The development of such facilities as the Lobito Corridor and the Abidjan–Lagos corridor is a priority direction of this expansion.
Despite the EU’s technological advantage, the strategy’s implementation is being slowed by two critical factors. The first is procedural slowness. Bureaucratic donor coordination and the dragging out of the feasibility-study stage reduce the speed of implementation, making the EU less competitive compared with actors that act directively. The second lies in the realm of security challenges. High risks make investment projects too expensive and risky for private capital. Accordingly, the key task becomes creating conditions under which European corporations can implement capital-intensive projects without waiting for the full stabilization of the region, relying instead on the systemic support of state financial institutions.
However, financial guarantees are insufficient where security stability is absent, which makes EU–Africa military cooperation necessary. Since 2022, the EU’s key security instrument has been the European Peace Facility (EPF), through which Brussels implements a “stabilization donor” model, focusing mainly on the supply of non-lethal equipment and the professional training of local security forces. The differentiated geography of assistance covers countering jihadism in West Africa, ensuring freedom of navigation in East Africa, and localizing conflicts in the center and south of the continent. The prioritization of partners’ requests and the shift to bilateral agreements allow the EU to respond promptly to challenges, avoiding the bureaucratic delays of collective cooperation formats.
At the same time, EU security policy faces a funding deficit due to the prioritization of Global Gateway economic projects. On the other hand, in Africa, Brussels is increasingly becoming hostage to a conflict between political principles and economic interests. A vivid example is the financing of the Rwandan contingent in Mozambique to protect the assets of TotalEnergies. By choosing Kigali as the executor, the EU finds itself in a trap: on the one hand, Rwandan forces effectively secure energy facilities, while on the other, support for Rwanda, which is destabilizing the neighboring DRC, substantially complicates pan-European efforts to settle regional conflicts and undermines trust in the European peacekeeping strategy.
Ukraine’s integration into EU projects in Africa requires a shift to a subcontracting model within consortia with European engineering, procurement, and construction contractors, which would allow Ukrainian business to bypass regulatory barriers and insurance restrictions. The key niches for cooperation are engineering and technical audit, the implementation of government technology solutions, and equipment service support, where experience of working under high-risk conditions becomes a competitive advantage. To this end, the state needs to shift its focus from political lobbying to institutional support, establishing systematic communication with European business and financial institutions in order to integrate Ukrainian companies into tender consortia.
United Kingdom’s New Approach to African Continent
Historically, Africa has occupied a central place in the United Kingdom’s foreign policy only episodically. The highest level of diplomatic and investment engagement came in the era of Tony Blair, after which London’s attention to the continent fluctuated, subordinated rather to situational domestic political crises. However, the balance of forces began to change fundamentally in 2024, when the government of Keir Starmer officially proclaimed a course toward forming a new format of partnership between the United Kingdom and the countries of Africa.
The United Kingdom’s updated strategy, the “New Approach to Africa” (December 2025), replaces direct aid with a model of equal investment partnership, driven both by budget cuts (to 0.3 percent of gross national income) and by the need for an effective alternative to the dominant players. London’s priorities cover attracting private capital, climate initiatives, and security partnerships in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana. Using the Commonwealth of Nations as an instrument for promoting its own standards, Britain positions its approach as a high-quality alternative to Beijing’s “debt traps” and the security expansion of the Russian Federation.
The financial core of the British strategy is British International Investment. London is betting on the mobilization of private capital through innovative guarantee instruments that transform local African projects into a format of public investment products capable of raising funds on international markets, including the London Stock Exchange. Additional momentum is provided by UK Export Finance, where African projects account for a fifth of the entire lending portfolio, reinforcing trade finance in key hubs, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania.
A key priority of British capital is the “green transition” and climate investments, whose volume through these mechanisms has exceeded 1 billion dollars per year for the first time. The funds are being directed to large-scale renewable energy projects.
A separate vector is the development of digital and logistics infrastructure through the financing of pan-African asset management companies. A telling example is the injection of 76 million dollars into a pan-African infrastructure investment fund. Thanks to this tranche, Britain is financing three key segments: digital infrastructure, the energy transition, and ports in a number of countries, including the DRC, Morocco, Senegal, and Mozambique. This approach allows London to create an infrastructure alternative to China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative while avoiding accusations of creating debt traps, since the money works through local African institutions.
Britain consolidates its influence through instruments of business diplomacy, including summits such as the London–Africa Business Summit, and expanded trade partnerships. In West Africa, London pursues a comprehensive approach to Nigeria: from port modernization to integration into the financial and energy sectors. In East Africa, Kenya has become a strategic hub, where, through investments in projects on the level of Nairobi Railway City and the entry of the insurance giant Lloyd’s of London, Britain is creating an infrastructure and financial presence. In parallel, London draws on the experience of its companies in fintech, agritech, and cybersecurity, countering the “Chinese path” with the creation of high-margin ecosystems that integrate African markets with British capital and expertise.
The British strategy of security presence in Africa is based on the “Train and Equip” concept, which envisages personnel training and institution building instead of a direct presence. The key elements of this architecture are strategic training hubs, such as the British Army Training Unit in Kenya and the center in Baidoa (Somalia), where British instructors build the combat capability of national armies and African Union forces. At the same time, through the instruments of the UK Integrated Security Fund, London implements targeted programs on cybersecurity and counterterrorism in Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, which allows it to support stability flexibly.
It is worth noting that the success of the British strategy depends on London’s ability to overcome the historical skepticism of African elites regarding the “neocolonial” nature of British standards and to prove that the model of partnership through investment is not merely a way of compensating for the reduction in state aid.
The United Kingdom is the most natural partner for Ukraine in Africa among European states. Ukrainian diplomacy should synchronize its efforts with the British “New Approach to Africa”. Since London is betting on human capital development, digitalization, and food security (agribusiness), Ukraine can act as a subcontractor or partner in joint British–Ukrainian projects in Commonwealth countries (Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa), using British financial mechanisms to scale its own technological solutions on the continent.
Models of Russian Expansion and Instruments of Influence in Region
In its cooperation with African countries, Russia uses a strategy in which security services are integrated with economic interests, allowing it to create the impression of a “great power” under conditions of limited resources and international isolation.
The security sector remains Russia’s main “entry point” onto the African continent, especially in countries with a high level of political instability. After Prigozhin’s failed mutiny in 2023 and his subsequent death, the operations of the Wagner private military company were transferred to the direct management of the Russian Ministry of Defense and structured as the “Africa Corps”. As of 2026, the “Africa Corps” numbers between 8,000 and 10,000 mercenaries. They operate in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Congo, with the following main tasks: direct participation in combat operations, training local forces, and guarding key facilities and the political leaders of host countries. To ensure the uninterrupted activity of the “Africa Corps”, logistics routes are used through Algeria (an aviation hub), Guinea and Cameroon (maritime supply), and Libya.
Russia is systematically forming a network of strategic nodes for power projection. After losing its positions in Syria (December 2024), the Russian Federation accelerated the creation of a naval facility in Port Sudan, which was officially agreed on February 12, 2025. This facility is key to controlling sea routes through which about 12% of world trade passes. To this end, Moscow is also considering Madagascar and the Gulf of Guinea as sites for potential bases.
This military presence is only part of a broader architecture of Russian influence that operates in symbiosis with networks of covert political interference, such as African Politology, which function as operators of information and psychological operations in African countries.
Moscow’s military activity is not an end in itself; it functions as an instrument for converting force-based influence into direct economic dividends. “Security in exchange for resources” is the foundation of the Russian presence: through the “Africa Corps”, Moscow integrates military support with gaining control over strategic assets – from gold mines in Sudan and Mali to diamond and uranium deposits in the CAR and oil fields in Libya.
However, despite its attempts to create the image of an influential player, Russia’s economic and investment engagement in Africa remains limited. It clusters around individual states that have a high level of political vulnerability or an interest in Russia’s military-industrial complex. In this context, Russia’s economic strategy in Africa is based on securing access to strategic minerals through the activities of such large holdings as Rusal, Alrosa, and NordGold.
The strategy of using the assets of large companies as long-term levers of influence over African states is also relevant to energy cooperation, which has a dual purpose: generating foreign currency revenue under conditions of isolation and creating the institutional dependence of partner countries. In addition, Russia is actively promoting “floating nuclear power units” as a quick solution for energy-deficient regions (relevant memoranda have been signed with Guinea, Mali, Congo, and Rwanda), which allows Moscow to position itself as a key partner in Africa’s “energy transition”.
However, Western sanctions (particularly against Lukoil and Rosneft) are forcing Russian players to optimize their asset portfolios. In particular, Lukoil is reducing its stakes in certain projects (Ghana, Nigeria) in which Western corporations (Chevron) are showing interest.
Russia’s infrastructure presence is selective in nature and aimed at expanding the “North–South” logistics corridor and implementing Russian Railways (RZD) projects in Burkina Faso, Ghana, South Africa, and Libya. However, due to limited investment resources compared with China, Moscow uses these initiatives primarily as an instrument of geopolitical influence rather than as a driver of regional economic development.
The above makes clear that, unlike the systemic initiatives of the EU or the US, the Russian Federation’s strategy in Africa lacks a coherent “umbrella” approach. Instead, it is based on situational opportunism, in which the targeted monetization of resources in exchange for security services replaces systemic investment in development, and projects rest on personal arrangements with local elites.
This fundamental weakness of Russia is the main entry point for Ukrainian diplomacy, which can counter it with an offer of transparent, institutional cooperation. Ukraine should emphasize that Russian projects are a “one-day economy” that brings no development, whereas cooperation in the agricultural sector, information technology (IT), or education is an investment in the stability of African states themselves. The limits of Russian financial capital and the sanctions pressure on Lukoil and Rosneft create a window of opportunity for Kyiv: offering African countries alternative, transparent energy partnerships and experience in diversifying supply sources.
Comprehensive Model of PRC Economic Expansion
In Africa, China is implementing a concept of comprehensive economic dominance, forming closed logistics and technology ecosystems in which Chinese capital, contractors, technological standards, and management protocols form a single chain. In this system, Beijing provides African states with access to large-scale financing and infrastructure solutions in exchange for long-term control over critical minerals and the right to a geostrategic presence for power projection. This strategy is reinforced by powerful instruments of trade liberalization – notably, the elimination of import tariffs for 53 of Africa’s 54 countries (which entered into force on May 1, 2026, with the exception of Eswatini due to its support for Taiwan).
China’s strategy is evolving from the large-scale infrastructure of the “Belt and Road” toward “small and beautiful” projects in the areas of digital and “green” technologies aimed at increasing the loyalty of local communities.
China remains Africa’s leading trading partner with a turnover of 275 billion dollars (2024), but its investment model has undergone a transformation. Having abandoned the “broad market capture” strategy of the 2010s, Beijing has moved to a targeted approach. Instead of a network of scattered projects, China focuses on a limited number of large-scale investments in strategic sectors. Examples include the creation of production hubs for electric vehicles and batteries in Morocco (for access to EU markets), a metallurgical plant in Zimbabwe, and the deepening of control over the extraction of critical minerals (lithium, copper) in Zimbabwe, the DRC, and Namibia. This model allows Beijing to control supply chains that are critically important to the global economy more effectively while minimizing its own risks.
The abandonment of mass lending does not mean the abandonment of strategic corridors. The revival of the TAZARA railway is a key project linking Zambia’s copper belt with the port of Dar es Salaam. This infrastructure node is a direct geopolitical challenge to Western initiatives, particularly the Lobito Corridor, and demonstrates China’s desire to retain control over key transit arteries.
At the same time, supporting transport logistics through targeted investments in seaports remains a critical element for ensuring the PRC’s logistical advantage on the continent. Today, Chinese state corporations hold stakes, management contracts, or construction contracts in 78 ports in 32 countries, covering about a third of all African port capacity. A vivid example of vertical integration is Nigeria’s Lekki port. Beyond its physical presence, China exports its own digital standards – from automated management systems to artificial intelligence solutions, which not only modernizes local logistics but also creates a deep technical dependence of African governments on Beijing.
China’s strategy in Africa goes far beyond commerce, gradually transforming civilian hubs into “dual-use” facilities. A symbol of this integration is the 38-year concession of Hutchison Ports to manage a terminal at Egypt’s Abu Qir naval base, demonstrating the penetration of Chinese business into the military infrastructure of its partners. In parallel, Beijing is creating a network of specialized military facilities. This infrastructure provides a logistical basis for the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which actively uses the ports of Dar es Salaam, Lagos, Durban, and Doraleh for regular visits and the expansion of its presence.
Since 2000, the People’s Liberation Army has carried out 55 port calls and conducted 19 military exercises, but the past 18 months have marked a qualitative shift. The “Amani na Umoja” (2024) exercises became its largest deployment in the history of Africa, involving for the first time units from mainland China, Y-20 transport aircraft, and Yuzhao-class landing platform docks. The “Eagles of Civilization” (2025) exercises in Egypt became the first mission of the Chinese air force in Africa involving complex logistics and aerial refueling. The “Will for Peace” (2026) exercises near South Africa for the countries of BRICS cemented the PRC’s role as coordinator of an emerging security bloc.
Beijing integrates security cooperation into its global initiatives, notably the Global Security Initiative, where the priority is supporting loyal regimes. Under the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation plan for 2024–2027, China is allocating 140 million dollars to train 6,500 African security personnel and to supply surveillance technologies. At the same time, Beijing is actively competing on the arms market, exporting Cai Hong-4 series combat unmanned aerial vehicles to Nigeria, the DRC, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria, as well as armored vehicles to Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, and Benin. Beyond the state level, China uses private security structures that operate in 14 countries to protect investment assets, which together creates a comprehensive mechanism of control and influence.
The PRC’s strategic expansion in Africa creates a challenge for Ukraine that cannot be overcome through quantitative competition. Its window of opportunity is the niche of flexible technological solutions (IT services, agritech, specialized engineering), where intellectual expertise is critically important. Ukrainian diplomacy should promote a narrative of equal partnership, emphasizing that free access to technologies and knowledge is a more effective instrument of development.
Conclusions for Ukraine
To strengthen Ukraine’s positions in Africa, the key strategy should be the export of expertise, which will make it possible to shape Ukraine’s image as a reliable, technologically advanced, and transparent player. Unlike the Russian Federation, which offers purely force-based solutions, or the PRC, which imposes debt dependence, Ukraine can offer the experience of institutional transformation. This entails promoting solutions in the sphere of public administration, which are critically in demand among African elites seeking modernization without the loss of political sovereignty.
The second vector should be the export of applied solutions focused on narrow niches where Ukraine has a competitive advantage thanks to flexibility and intellectual value. Ukraine should concentrate on integrating into existing chains through agritech, small-scale energy, educational services, and specialized engineering. This approach creates a sustainable network of partnerships based on a real increase in the capacity of African states.
The publication is prepared under the project “Strengthening the Analytical Capabilities of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making with the Civil Society” of the Centre for International Security with the support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ukraine.
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