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The inaugural Global Peace Summit has become an important stage in the process of implementing the Peace Formula, which the leadership of Ukraine presents as the only realistic peace plan that can end the war. The intensification of public rhetoric on further actions, in particular on the preparation of a peace plan and the holding of the second Peace Summit before the end of this year, actualizes the need for an impartial analysis of its results and potential. To this end, the study analyzes the key problems regarding the implementation of the Ukrainian vision of the peace process, which were revealed by the Summit in Bürgenstock and which may affect the future work in this direction of Ukraine's foreign policy.

1. Main positive results of the Peace Summit

The inaugural Global Peace Summit, which took place on June 15-16, 2024 in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, became an outstanding foreign policy event in the history of not only Ukrainian diplomacy, but also modern international relations. The meeting was a long-awaited and previously announced element of the work on the implementation of the Peace Formula of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Among its main positive results, which emphasize the success of the organizational process and diplomatic efforts of the Ukrainian team, it is advisable to note the following:

Ensuring wide participation of representatives of the international community in the Summit. According to the data released at the end of the Peace Summit by the host party, the event was attended by representatives of 92 countries (including Ukraine and Switzerland) and Kosovo, unrecognized by Ukraine. Of these, 56 were represented at the level of heads of state and government, 32 at the ministerial level, 5 at the other level. The

Summit was also attended by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople and 5 international organizations (in particular, the European Union, which was represented by three separate delegations). In total, 101 delegations participating in the Peace Summit give a count¹.

Adoption of a joint document within the Summit. During the Peace Summit, a Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework was issued². This document contains: emphasis on the need to comply with international law, in particular the UN Charter, as well as certain resolutions of the UN General Assembly, which condemn Russian aggression against Ukraine and affirm respect for the territorial integrity of our state; a common vision is fixed on the need to address nuclear security, food security and the release of prisoners and deported persons, which corresponds to the three points of the Peace Formula of the President of Ukraine, which were discussed at the Peace Summit. According to preliminary information, 84 delegations supported the joint communiqué, but during June 16-17, three delegations asked to be excluded from the list of signatories of the document. At the same time, it remains open to accession, and the circle of its participants is gradually expanding. As of July 29, their number is 92 countries and organizations³.

Preservation of the "red lines" in the context of Ukraine's position. Despite some speculations and provocative forecasts⁴, during the Peace Summit itself, no concessions on the part of Ukraine were recorded, which could be interpreted as a rejection of the previously announced vision regarding the path to restoring peace. The Russian Federation was not involved in the event, which corresponds to the position declared by Kyiv regarding the impossibility of negotiating with the Putin regime⁵. The joint communiqué on the foundations of peace, despite the pronounced compromise nature of the document, also contains some important provisions for Ukraine – in particular, on the need to restore Ukrainian control over the Zaporizhzhia NPP, which can be interpreted as an indirect demand to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of the plant.

¹ Summit on Peace in Ukraine (17.06.2024). Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Switzerland. Accessed 27.07.2024. URL: https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/dta/aktuell/dossiers/konferenz-zum-frieden-ukraine.html

² Спільне комюніке про основи миру. Офіційний веб-сайт Президента України (16.06.2024). Accessed 28.07.2024. URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/news/spilne-komyunike-pro-osnovi-miru-91581

³ Summit on Peace in Ukraine: Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework (Updated 12.07.2024). Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Switzerland. Accessed 29.07.2024. URL: https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/aktuell/dossiers/konferenz-zum-frieden-ukraine/Summit-on-Peace-in-ukraine-joint-communique-on-a-peace-framework.html

⁴ Сидоренко С. Без миру та з компромісами. Які загрози несе Україні саміт у Швейцарії та чи можна їх уникнути (05.06.2024). Європейська Правда. Accessed 28.07.2024. URL: https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2024/06/5/7187503/
⁵ Указ Президента України №679/2022 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 30 вересня 2022 року «Щодо дій України у відповідь на спробу Російської Федерації анексувати території нашої держави, з метою гарантування безпеки євроатлантичного простору, України та відновлення її територіальної цілісності». Офіційний веб-сайт Президента України. Accessed 27.07.2024. URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/6792022-44249







2. Key issues that the Peace Summit revealed

Even though the organization of the Peace Summit can be interpreted as a success of Ukrainian diplomacy, the event illustrated some problematic issues that accompany the implementation of the Peace Formula.

Despite the appeal to the globality of the Peace Summit, in practice we can state a certain "West-centrism" of the West. This is confirmed by:

- The Global South is not sufficiently represented at the Summit. Of the 93 countries that took part in the event, almost half are countries of the so-called "Collective West". The Summit was attended by 2 countries of North America and almost all of Europe (47 states, including Kosovo; only Azerbaijan refrained from participating in the event). Relatively widely represented were the Middle East (7 countries) and South America (7 out of 12 countries in the region). At the same time, only 14 countries of Africa (out of 54 located on the continent), 4 countries of Central America and the Caribbean, 12 countries of Asia and Oceania took part in the Peace Summit. In the latter case, the participants include 4 countries (Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Japan), which in the traditional distribution belong to the developed West⁶.
- The absence or participation at a relatively low level of the leading states of the Global South. The key country in this region, which today claims global leadership and is the second (after the United States) center of power in the international arena the People's Republic of China did not take part in the Peace Summit. Other member countries of the BRICS format a kind of competitoralternative to the Group of Seven although they participated in the event, but not at the level of heads of state and government. For example, India was represented by the deputy minister of foreign affairs, South Africa was represented by the adviser to the President, and Brazil was represented by the ambassador to Switzerland. It deserves special attention that the Brazilian delegation was present at the Summit only as observers, as evidenced by the published list of participants

Despite the presentation of the Peace Summit as an event in which the Peace Formula of the President of Ukraine was discussed at the highest level, in practice the **topic of discussion was significantly limited**. Only issues that meet the three points of the

⁶ Summit on Peace in Ukraine. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Switzerland (17.06.2024). Accessed 27.07.2024. URL: https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/dtda/aktuell/dossiers/konferenz-zum-frieden-ukraine.html

initiative were put on the agenda of the Peace Summit (paragraph 1 "Radiation and nuclear safety", paragraph 2 "Food security" and paragraph 4 "Release of prisoners and deported persons"). This approach was probably dictated by the desire to focus on the least confrontational parts of the peace plan. However, such a narrow focus can be taken as evidence of the lack of readiness of the international community for substantive discussion of other key points of the Peace Formula, such as the implementation of the UN Charter and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the world order (clause 5), withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities (clause 6), restoration of justice (clause 7), etc.

Even a significant limitation of the subject of discussion at the Peace Summit, and accordingly not including more confrontational issues in the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework, did not provide absolute support for the document by the participants. Three countries (Iraq, Jordan, Rwanda) de facto withdrew their support for the document on the first day after the completion of the Summit. Although the total number of supporters of the communiqué looks relatively optimistic, the study of the list of countries demonstrates that key representatives of the Global South did not support the document. In particular, this position was demonstrated by Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Saudi Arabia. Special attention should be paid to the refusal to support the Joint Communiqué of the Middle East – only 2 states of the region (Israel, Qatar) out of 7 that participated in the Summit joined it.

3. Ukrainian vision for further work

The Peace Summit was supposed to lay the foundation for intensifying the work aimed at further implementation of the Peace Formula of the President of Ukraine. A general outline of Kyiv's vision of this process has already been repeatedly presented by the leadership of the state and the Office of the President of Ukraine.

Initially, all ten points of the Peace Formula were discussed at the level of national security advisers. During the last meeting of advisers in Davos, the Head of the OPU Andriy Yermak noted that "as a result of consultations, we want to develop a joint plan for the responsible states of the world. The next step may be the first global summit at the level of leaders of states and governments, which will be launched at the highest political level to develop and agree on a single, joint peace plan. And if the aggressor state really







demonstrates a desire to end this war and return to respect for international law, we will have this common peace plan for such a moment"⁷.

Following the Peace Summit, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted: "...We proposed and agreed to continue our joint work at a more technical level – at the level of advisers and ministers in the format of special meetings chaired or co-chaired by countries... We agreed to start working in special groups after the Summit on specific ideas, proposals, developments that can restore security in various aspects. Just as it worked at the level of advisers and ministers during the preparation of the first Peace Summit... And we invite all countries that recognize the binding nature of the UN Charter as the basis for the cooperation of nations to participate in the work of groups and express their ideas and proposals. I am sure that together we will ensure the result. The first and second Peace Summits should unite our joint work on the details of peace. We are at war, and we do not have time for long work – the movement towards peace means quick action, preparation will take months, not years".

During a press conference on July 15, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy set the task that the plan for the Second Peace Summit should be fully prepared in November. He noted that in late July – early August, the first meeting will be held at the level of ministers, security advisers on the results of the Peace Summit. It is likely to be organized in Qatar and will deal with the topic of energy security. In August, the second meeting in Turkey on free navigation and issues of food security is expected. In September, a meeting is planned in Canada on the humanitarian direction – the exchange of prisoners and the return of children. As a result of each meeting, appropriate plans will be developed that will be used to prepare the second Peace Summit. At the same time, the President of Ukraine noted that this event should be representatives of Russia⁹.

4. Current "pitfalls" on the implementation of the Peace Formula

Statements of the Ukrainian leadership regarding further actions to implement the Peace Formula raise certain issues that need to be resolved and clarified.

⁷ Андрій Єрмак за результатами зустрічі радників у Давосі: У нас іще багато роботи попереду, але ми єдині щодо ключових принципів миру для України та всього світу (15.01.2024). Офіційний веб-сайт Президента України. Accessed 27.07.2024. URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/news/andrij-yermak-za-rezultatami-zustrichi-radnikiv-u-davosi-u-n-88333

⁸ Заява Президента України Володимира Зеленського під час зустрічі з представниками ЗМІ за підсумками Глобального саміту миру (16.06.2024). Офіційний веб-сайт Президента України. Accessed 27.07.2024. URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelenskogo-pid-chas-zu-91593

⁹ Година гострих запитань до Зеленського! Пресконференція президента України 15 липня 2024. ТСН. Accessed 28.07.2024. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cR2E4U1z3iw

First, in the public speeches of the Ukrainian leadership, there is no confirmation yet as to what exact points of the Peace Formula it is planned to prepare concrete plans on the eve of the second Peace Summit (so far only three points are clearly mentioned). The lack of a clear statement that work will be carried out on all points of the Ukrainian initiative gives grounds for speculation about the possible refusal of Ukraine from certain elements of the Peace Formula. This, in turn, could be interpreted as a recognition that the Peace Formula is not an effective integral plan. The emphasis on certain points, which has been done recently, only serves as an extra argument in favor of such a position. A certain non-system (for example, points 1, 2 and 4 were discussed at the Peace Summit, while the President of Ukraine mentions future actions regarding points 2, 3 and 4 at a press conference) further confuses the situation with the understanding of Ukraine's approach.

The statements of the President of Ukraine about the participation of representatives of Russia in the Second Peace Summit can be interpreted ambiguously. On the one hand, the Ukrainian leadership emphasizes the inadmissibility of violating the red lines, which is the restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. At this, the inability of the current Russian regime to constructively negotiate was repeatedly emphasized. On the other hand, there are now clear signals about the need to involve Russia in the peace process at a certain stage. Even if the appearance of this thesis is a forced step caused by the position of some influential countries of the Global South, and it is aimed at an external audience, it can be critically perceived within the state. This can be used by the enemy to conduct IPSO (informational and psychological operation) aimed at loosening the domestic political situation in the state.

Now it is not obvious that the discussion on certain points of the Peace Formula will be able to lead to an agreement on the solution of the relevant issues as soon as possible. Without the real involvement of the Global South in the process of discussion and decision-making, as well as – a guarantee of their joining the implementation of the abovementioned decisions, negotiations at the level of advisers and ministers have a limited potential only for information and propaganda.

At the same time, in the process of discussion, Ukraine will have to make efforts to prove that it is the Peace Formula that should become the basis for a peaceful settlement. This position is threatened by the so-called "peace initiatives" of other states, which in practice are aimed at de facto legalization of Russia's occupation of the territories of Ukraine. The most threatening in this context is the position of China, which on February 24, 2023, presented its vision (12 points¹⁰) to resolve the "Ukrainian crisis", and on the eve of the

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¹⁰ China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis (24.02.2023). MFA of China. Accessed: 27.07.2024. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa eng/zxxx 662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html







Peace Summit involved Brazil in the presentation of a common position on this issue¹¹. In its further efforts to promote its own plan, China can probably count on its African satellites (in continuation of the African peace initiative, announced in the summer of 2023) and Hungarian leader Viktor Orban¹².

5. Conclusions

The inaugural Global Peace Summit was an important diplomatic event. The very fact of its holding and the wide representation of all regions of the world, despite the active opposition of Russia, became a significant success. An important result of the Summit was the presentation of the Joint Communiqué, which became the first document on Ukrainian peacekeeping initiatives that received wide support (although not from all participants of the event).

The emphasis on the need for a Peace Summit, which was made by representatives of Ukraine in the information plane, created certain high expectations from this event. At the same time, the Peace Summit did not bring significant decisions regarding the practical content of the peace process. It cannot be considered as a result of the long diplomatic work that is going on around the Peace Formula of the President of Ukraine (in particular, in the format of national security advisers). It rather became only an intermediate stage in the ongoing process, and this is how it should be perceived. Thus, the lack of adoption of a specific peace plan on it – which someone expected – does not affect the overall positive assessment of the event, because this was not its goal.

At the same time, the key issues that influence the further peace process and the prospect of turning the Peace Formula into a real diplomatic plan for ending the war remain unresolved. Among them, the most relevant are:

- Insufficient support for Ukrainian efforts from the countries of the Global South (both key states of these regions and a wide range of countries).
- The lack of a clear vision of how the work on specific areas (the paragraphs of the Peace Formula) should eventually lead to Russia's accepting acceptable for Ukraine peace conditions.

¹¹ Common Understandings Between China and Brazil on Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis (23.05.2024). MFA of China. Accessed: 27.07.2024. URL: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx 662805/202405/t20240523 11310698.html

¹² Report of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to Charles Michel, President of the European Council (18.07.2024). PM of Hungary. Accessed: 26.07.2024. URL: https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/report-of-prime-minister-viktor-orban-to-charles-michel-president-of-the-european-council/

In such circumstances, it is extremely important to continue the policy aimed at proving the global nature of the Peace Formula and the importance of its implementation. The key step is to convince the countries of the Global South that Russia's success will be a defeat for all countries seeking to live in a safe world. It is important to ensure not only the participation of the international community in the preparation of a joint peace plan, but also the consent of the countries of the world to carry out coercive measures in order to influence Russia in order to accept its conditions.

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